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Abstract 
We build a model of optimal design of managerial incentive schemes when the production technology exhibits 
decreasing returns to scale and firms compete à la Cournot. We borrow Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Kräkel 
(2005) framework. We show how there is a dominant strategy for entrepreneurs to delegate output decisions. Results 
depend on the degree of diseconomies of scale. We demostrate how for a class of parameters, managers may increase 
profits through delegation, a result that with constant returns does not hold.
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     1 Introduction
The analysis of the strategic use of managerial contracts in oligopolistic games started with
Vickers (1985) and further developed in Fershtman (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987),
and Sklivas (1987) (hereafter referred to as VFJS). The design of managerial contracts on
the part of ￿rms￿owners will a⁄ect managers￿decisions. Attention is restricted to a class
of linear combination contracts between pro￿ts and sales, that owners o⁄er to managers.
For example, if managers￿compensation schemes are made to depend on sales rather than
pro￿ts, managers will be less concerned about production costs. This will have the e⁄ect
of encouraging them to expand output, which indeed will return above oligopolistic output
levels. On the contrary if managers are encouraged to minimize costs, then they will be
less concerned on sales. Therefore, market outcomes, and ultimately consumer welfare, are
related to manager￿ s compensation schemes. In order to make the problem meaningful,
there must be a source of uncertainty (demand, costs etc.). Otherwise, if there was complete
information owners could enforce a quantity type of contract.
Under quantity competition with linear cost of production, Fershtman and Judd (1987)
show how a managerial contract that rewards managers on the basis of revenue has the e⁄ect
of committing the ￿rm to high levels of output, whereas under price competition owners put
a negative weight on sales. Pro￿ts for owners are lower than in the standard Cournot result.
However, some studies analyze the possibility of pro￿t increase through delegation. Basu
(1995) shows how when an additional decision to hire a manager stage is explictly included,
then Stackelberg solution may be obtained if di⁄erences in cost are su¢ ciently large. Jansen
et al. (2007) consider instead a (linear) combination of pro￿ts and market share. They show
how this is indeed a dominant strategy in which owners get higher pro￿ts than with a VFJS
type of contract, but lower than Cournot pro￿ts. These authors stress that the delegation
of control to managers in Cournot settings can be advantageous in that it may give rise
to Stackelberg leadership even though ￿rms move simultaneously. The equilibrium arising
in delegation games where ￿rms are Cournot players indeed involves both ￿rms delegating
control in order to try to achieve a dominant position. All ￿rms would prefer the rivals not
to delegate, and the equilibrium is a⁄ected by a prisoner￿ s dilemma.
Other studies have focused in di⁄erent versions of VFJS framework. Ishibashi (2001)
considers quality as well as price competition. Zhang and Zhang (1997) consider R&D in
a strategic delegation game. These studies share a common feature. They include a third
stage to the original two-stage game in order to allow for a third endogenous variable. Lam-
bertini (2000) considers a four-stage game in which delegation and strategic variables are
also endogenized. (Bhardwaj (2001) considers price competition and the choice of e⁄ort.in
a ￿ve-stage model. Results depend on the intensity of price competition. Prices are not
necessarily strategic complements as in Bulow at al. (1985). Miller and Pagal (2001) in a
di⁄erentiated products oligopoly model, show the equivalence of price and quantity compe-
tition when owners are able to design compensation schemes sucha that also depend upon
rival￿ s pro￿ts.
Kr￿kel (2005) studies strategic delegation in duopolistic tournaments with increasing
cost function. Despite the ex-ante symmetry of the problem, he shows the existence of an
asymmetric equilibrium where one owner puts a positive weight on sales (more aggresive
behavior) whereas the other puts a negative one.
1In this note, we borrow VJFS framework to analyze the role of diseconomies of scale when
entreprenuers are pro￿t-maximizers. The convexity of the cost function can be motivated as
an approach to the existence of capacity constraints and scarcity of resources. In this case,
owners may be more concerned on cost minimization. We would expect that convexity of
the cost function plays a signi￿cant role, as it does in Kr￿kel (2005). Optimal rewarding
schemes take into account how expanding output also increases cost at a higher rate than
under constant returns to scale. We assume demand is uncertain at the ￿rst stage of the
game for the owners.1
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 builds the model. Section 2 provides the
optimal rewarding scheme under quantity competition with random demand. We show how
the existence of a convex cost function may increase pro￿ts from delegation, as compared to
entrepreneurial management. Section 3 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a two-stage symmetric duopoly model with homogeneous product. Demand is





The cost function is increasing: Ci (qi) = 1
2cq2
i, where c > 0. Thus, marginal cost is given
by mci (qi) = cqi Each ￿rm is characterized by an owner and a manager. On the ￿rst
stage (compensation stage), each owner decides about an incentive scheme for the (single)
manager. Following VFJS, the optimal rewarding structure for the manager is a linear
combination of pro￿ts (￿i) and sales (Si) of the form,
Oi (Q) = ￿i￿i (Q) + (1 ￿ ￿i)Si (Q) for i = 1;2
or equivalently,
Oi = Si(Q) ￿ ￿iCi (qi)
where Si(Q) is the sales function, and ￿i 2 R, that is no restrictions are imposed on the
incentive parameter. The manager￿ s total compensation is given by Mi = Ai + BiOi (Bi >
0). The model assumes incentive schemes are observable by both parties and no further
renegotiations are allowed. Then, managers compete ￿ la Cournot.
The timing of the game is the following. In stage 1, owners simultaneously choose the
optimal rewarding structure (￿￿
1;￿￿
2). Then, in stage 2, managers simultaneusly choose
the optimal production levels (q￿
1;q￿
2). The model is solved by backward induction. We
obtain the equilibrium in the second stage as a function of the incentive parameters, and
without uncertainty on demand. Then, owners maximize expected pro￿ts choosing the
optimal rewarding scheme and knowing the probability distribution of demand.
1Cost uncertainty turns out to be untractable under increasing costs. Since we are interested in the role
strategic delegation under increasing costs, we do not consider this source of uncertainty as in Fershtman
and Judd(1987).
2We have normalized the slope of the demand function to be one because the qualitative results are the
same.
23 Incentive equilibrium
In stage two, the manager of each ￿rm observes c and the realization of e ￿, ￿. Each ￿rm￿ s
quantity is function of the incentive parameters; qi (￿i;￿j) for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j. Manager
of ￿rm i maximizes Oi, as de￿ned before, by choosing qi as a function not only of the rival￿ s
production level, but also on the incentive scheme designed by the owner:
maxqi (￿ ￿ Q)qi ￿ 1
2￿icq2
i:




and symmetrically for the other ￿rm. Note how even under quantity competition, a priori
it may be the case that quantities are strategic complements, in Bulow et Al (1985) sense
as long as ￿i < 0 and j￿ij > 2
c. This possibility does not arise in constant linear marginal
cost models. It holds that output is decreasing with ￿i, that is as the manager is forced
to be more concerned on costs, production shrinks. We ￿nd the equilibrium quantities as a





2c(￿i + ￿j) + c2￿i￿j + 3
.
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Proposition 1 summarizes the properties of the optimal rewarding scheme. Proof can be
found in Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 The optimal rewarding schedule in the symmetric equilibrium depends only












(c + 4)c ￿ 1
￿
:
Therefore, in the unique symmetric equilibrium the output level and the corresponding pro￿t
























which are positive for every c 2 (0;2:5943). It holds that ￿￿ (c) < 1 and limc￿!0 ￿￿ (c) = ￿1.
Note how pro￿t is linearly increasing with ￿. However, given a realization of the demand
it can be shown pro￿ts are concave in c > 0. As a result, it is feasible for ￿rms to increase
pro￿ts increasing production. Therefore, designing incentive schemes that encourage output
expansion is pro￿t-enhancing. Corollary 1 discusses the threshold of c at which ￿￿ (c) = 0.3
Corollary 1 If c = 0:5 then ￿￿ (0:5) = 0. Thus, if c 2 (0;0:5) then ￿￿ (c) < 0.
This means that the delegation contract puts a negative weight on pro￿ts. It actually
encourages managers to be more aggresive in the product market, since as c tends to zero the
cost function becomes ￿ atter and the marginal cost tends to zero. Proposition 2 considers
the range of the parameter c such that incentive scheme is either positive, but less than one,
or negative
Proposition 2 Assume ￿ is distributed with mean E (￿), then there is a unique subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game. If c(0;0:5] then ￿￿ ￿ 0, whereas if c(0:5;2:5943)
then ￿￿ 2 (0;1).
Putting a negative weight on pro￿ts is optimal for su¢ ciently ￿ at marginal cost. Rela-
tively high marginal cost is required to design contracts in which managers are encouraged
to be more concern on cost. Note how as an additional result from Proposition 2, in equilib-
rium best response functions of managers cannot be upward sloping. Therefore, best response
strategies can not be strategic complements. We also compare the predictions with those
under no delegation. Call qN the Nash equilibrium quantity when there is no delegation,













Our main result is summarized in Proposition 3. It compares output and pro￿ts when owners
o⁄er incentive schemes to managers and when they do not.
3I would like to thank an anonimous referee for suggesting this Corollary. As the referee explains, it is
interesting not only for technical reasons but also to understand the economics behind the model.
4Proposition 3 If c 2 (0:1993;0:8677) then pro￿ts from delegation are larger than pro￿ts
without delegation. Besides, total ￿rm output, and as a result total output in the incentive
equilibrium is always larger than in the absence of delegation.
In Figure 1 we depict the di⁄erence in pro￿ts and di⁄erence in ￿rm-ouput level under
delegation versus absence of delegation, as a function of c for a realization of e ￿.
Figure 1.
If c = 0:4461 then the positive di⁄erence reaches its maximum. This result is in contrast
with Fershtman and Judd (1987) for the case of linear costs, since delegation always reduces
total pro￿ts for the owners when demand is random, for every non-random c.4
4 Concluding remarks
In this note, we show how under decreasing returns to scale, there exist a symmetric equi-
librium in which delegation of production from owner to manager can be pro￿table. The
result depends on the curvature of the cost function. This is in contrast with Fershtman
and Judd (1987) where constant returns to scale are assumed. Therefore, the existence of
diseconomies of scale play a signi￿cant role for owners when demand is uncertain.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: In stage 1, owners choose (￿1;￿2) to maximize expected pro￿ts,
given q￿
1 (￿1;￿2) and q￿




c(c￿2 + 1)(2c + c2￿2 ￿ (2c￿1 + c2￿1￿2 + 1))
(2c(￿1 + ￿2) + c2￿1￿2 + 3)
3 = 0
The best response function for ￿rm 1 is:
￿1 (￿2) =









6We look for symmetric equilibrium, that is ￿￿
1 = ￿￿
2 = ￿￿. In equilibrium, since we have







































Properties of the solutions:
1. ￿I = ￿1
c < 0.








> 0 if c < 1
2.








< 0 for every c > 0.
Since the ￿rst order condition is non-linear, we hace to check second order conditions are






(4￿1 ￿ 2￿2 ￿ 3c￿2 + 2c￿1￿2 ￿ 6)(c￿2 + 2)(c￿2 + 1)c3
(2c￿1 + 2c￿2 + c2￿1￿2 + 3)
4




The equilibrium output is zero for each ￿rm, then pro￿ts are zero as well. The
second order condition is not-determined. Therefore, it cannot be a solution.
￿
￿II;￿II￿
The second order condition has three multiplying terms: (1)
￿p
c3 (c + 4) ￿ c2 ￿ 2c
￿
<




c3 (c + 4) ￿ c3 ￿ 4c2 + c
p
c3 (c + 4)
￿￿4
> 0 for every c > 0,
and (3) c3 (c + 4) ￿ 2c4 ￿ 8c3 + 2c
p
c3 (c + 4) + c2p
c3 (c + 4) > 0 for every c > 0.



























































(4 + c)c ￿ (2 + c)
￿
(4 + c)
which are negative since the denominator is always negative for every c 2 R+). There-
fore it cannot be a solution.
￿
￿III;￿III￿
The second order condition has three multiplying terms: (1) 2
￿
4c2 + c3 + 2
p
c3 (c + 4) + c
p
c3 (c + 4)
￿￿4
>
0 for every c > 0, (2)
￿
c3 (c + 4) ￿ 2c4 ￿ 8c3 ￿ 2c
p
c3 (c + 4) ￿ c2p
c3 (c + 4)
￿
< 0 for
7every c > 0, and
￿
2c + c2 +
p




c3 (c + 4)
￿
c2 > 0 for every c > 0.























4 + c +
p
4c + c2





































which is positive for every c 2 (0;2:5943). We call ￿III
1 = ￿III
2 = ￿￿.￿
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof follows directly from Proposition 1. We show the







(c + 4)c ￿ 1
￿
. It is holds that if c < 1
2 then ￿￿ < 0 and that
0 ￿ ￿￿ < 1 if c ￿ 1












(c + 4)c ￿ 1
￿








(c + 4)c ￿ 1
￿
, which is one. Thus, there is an upper













(c + 4)c ￿ 1
￿








(c + 4)c ￿ 1
￿
, which is not de￿ned and tends to minus
in￿nite.￿
Proof of Proposition 3: We substract pro￿ts and output with and without delegation
to obtain the expression,
￿





















￿ (c) ￿ q
N (c) =
2￿
4 + c +
p
4c + c2 ￿
￿
c + 3
Expressions cannot be easily simpli￿ed. We simulate results for some feasible realizations of




such that ￿ > 0.￿
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